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A b s tr a c t . T he first genera tion  o f E u ro p ean  e-passports  will be issued 
in  2006. We discuss how borders are crossed regard ing  th e  security  and 
privacy erosion o f th e  p roposed  schem es, and  show w hich borders need 
to  be crossed to  im prove th e  security  and  th e  privacy p ro tec tio n  of the 
nex t genera tion  of e-passports. In  p a rticu la r we discuss a tta ck s  on Basic 
Access C on tro l due to  th e  low en tropy  of th e  d a ta  from  w hich th e  access 
keys are derived, we sketch  th e  E u ro p ean  proposals for E x ten d ed  Access 
C ontro l and  th e  w eaknesses in  th a t  schem e, and  show how fundam enta lly  
d ifferent design decisions can  m ake e-passports  m ore secure.
1 Introduction
After several years of preparation, many countries start issuing e-passports with 
an embedded chip holding biometric data of the passport holder in 2006. This is 
a major ICT-operation, involving many countries, most of them  providing their 
own implementation, using biometrics at an unprecedented scale. Passport secur­
ity must conform to international (public) standards, issued by the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) [11, 10]. The standards cover confidential­
ity, integrity and authenticity of the passport data, including the facial image. 
Additionally, the European Union (EU) has developed its own standards (called 
“Extended Access Control” ).
The present paper reviews these developments (like in [14, 15]) especially 
from a European perspective, with corresponding emphasis on fingerprint pro­
tection. Also it tries to put these developments within a wider perspective of 
identity management (IM) by governments, following [8]. This leads to a “revi­
sion” plan for e-passports.
From an academic background we, the authors, closely follow the introduc­
tion of the e-passport in the Netherlands. We have advised the government on 
several matters, and are involved in public debates on related issues. We have 
received an early test version of the e-passport, and developed our own reader- 
side software, based on the ICAO protocols. We have had access to confidential
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material regarding the EU-protocols. However, the present paper is based solely 
on publicly available material, and is organised as follows.
We first discuss the main security requirements the new e-passport should 
satisfy. After a brief discussion of biometry in Sect. 3, we describe the standard 
security measures of the ICAO standard and the weaknesses associated with 
them in Sect. 4 . Future European e-passports will be equipped with Extended 
Access Control, which we outline in Sect. 5, and whose shortcomings we also 
study. e-Passports enable new applications. Sect. 6 discusses the danger of such 
function creep but also investigates the new possibilities created by such ap­
plications. We study identity management issues of the e-passport in Sect. 7, 
and evaluate the realisation of the original goals in Sect. 8. We finish the pa­
per with some proposals for more fundamental changes to the architecture of a 
second generation of e-passports tha t will increase both their security and their 
flexibility of use in new applications.
2 A im s and Security  G oals
It is a fact th a t modern passports are hard to forge. Thus, many criminal organ­
isations do not even try  such fraud, but instead collect large numbers of genuine 
passports, and pick one th a t shows a reasonable resemblance to a member that 
needs a new identity. Similarly, passports are sometimes borrowed for illegal 
border crossing, and later returned to the rightful owner.
The original aim of the use of biometrics in travel documents is thus to com­
bat “look-alike” fraud. Hence the emphasis is on biometric verification (instead 
of identification), involving a 1:1 check to make sure tha t a particular passport 
really belongs to a particular person.
The biometrics of the passport holder will be included in a chip tha t is 
embedded in the passport. Communication with the chip will be wireless, and 
not via contact points, because wireless communication allows higher data rates, 
does not involve wear, and does not require a change of the standard format of 
the passport to for instance credit-card size1.
The wireless character does introduce new security risks (with respect to 
traditional passports), for the holder, the issuing state, and for the accepting 
state. At a high level of abstraction, the following three security goals seem 
reasonable. The first two focus on confidentiality for the passport holder. The 
last one mainly concerns the accepting (and also issuing) state.
1. A passport reader should identify itself first, so tha t only “trusted” parties 
get to read the information stored in the chip.
2. No identifying information should be released without consent of the pass­
port holder.
3. The receiver of the information should be able to establish the integrity and 
authenticity of the data.
1 A change of fo rm at for o th e r official docum ents, like a  drivers licence, is seen as less 
p rob lem atic , because such a docum ent is n o t stam ped .
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The first goal relates to the situation where for instance a police officer wishes 
to check your identity. In most countries you have the right to ask the police 
officer in question to  identify himself first, so tha t you can be sure tha t you are 
dealing with a genuine representative of the state. The second goal is relevant 
to prevent “RFID-bombs” [14] for instance, tha t are activated by the immedi­
ate presence of (the passport of) a particular person, or citizen of a particular 
country. Such information is also useful for a terrorist who is trying to decide 
whether to blow himself up in a particular bus. We shall evaluate the realisation 
of these goals later on, in Sect. 8
3 B iom etry
This paper does not focus on the biometry involved, but a few words are in 
order. ICAO has opted for the use of facial images and fingerprints as primary 
biometrics because they are reasonably familiar, easy to use, and non-intrusive. 
A controversial issue—from a privacy perspective—is tha t the passport chip will 
not contain templates but pictures (actual JPEGs). The reason is th a t there is 
no well-established digital standard for such templates, and early commitment 
to a closed proprietary format is not desirable. This means that if a passport 
chip (or data base, or reader) is compromised, original biometric data leaks out, 
which may lead to reconstruction and additional (identity) fraud.
The effectiveness of biometry is highly overrated, especially by politicians 
and policy makers. Despite rapid growth in applications, the large-scale use of 
biometry is untested. The difficulty is that it is not only unproven in a huge single 
application (such as e-passports), but also not with many different applications in 
parallel (including “biometry for fun” ). The interference caused by the diversity 
of applications—each with its own security policy, if any—may lead to  unforeseen 
forms of fraud.
A basic issue tha t is often overlooked is fallback. W hat if my biometric iden­
tity  has been compromised, and I am held responsible for something I really did 
not do, how can I still prove “it wasn’t me”?
The Netherlands has recently conducted a field test for the enrolment proced­
ures of the biometric passport, see [19], involving almost 15.000 participants. The 
precise interpretation of the outcome is unclear, but failure-to-acquire turns out 
to be a significant problem, especially for young and elderly people. Substantial 
numbers of people will thus not have appropriate biometric travel documents, 
so th a t fully automatic border crossing is not an option.
4 Standard Security  M easures (IC A O )
The various ICAO standards for machine readable travel documents, notably [11] 
and [10], specify precise requirements for accessing and interpreting the contents 
of the embedded chip. Different security controls are described to ensure that 
different security goals are met. We discuss these in the order in which the 
mechanisms are used in a typical session between reader (or: inspection system,
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Fig. 1. Example of a Dutch passport. The two bottom  lines of text are the MRZ.
the computer th a t is attem pting to read information from the document) and 
the European passport chip.
BAC: Basic Access Control. Before any information can be read from a passport, 
the reader needs to go through basic access control (BAC). This is a challenge- 
response protocol in which the reader proves to the passport tha t it has know­
ledge of the contents of the machine readable zone (MRZ). The MRZ consists 
of two lines of optically readable text containing among others the name of the 
holder, and the passport number. It is printed on the first page of the physical 
document (See Fig. 1) .
The procedure is as follows. The reader optically reads the contents of the 
MRZ, and derives the access key seed k IFD/ ICC from the data it reads. After 
that, the reader proves to the chip th a t it has optically read the MRZ by signing 
a random challenge from the chip using a key derived from the access key seed. 
Subsequently, passport and inspection system exchange some extra random data, 
which is then used to generate session keys and an initial counter for secure 
messaging. The session keys are fresh for each session.
BAC prevents so-called skimming of passports, i.e., reading the contents 
without the cardholder’s knowledge. Note tha t BAC does not authenticate the 
reader: anyone who knows the MRZ can successfully complete BAC and continue 
reading other information on the chip.
SM: Secure Messaging. Confidentiality and integrity of all communication between 
reader and passport is provided by so-called secure messaging. Commands sent to 
the passport as well as responses sent back to the reader are encrypted and aug­
mented with a message authentication code (MAC), using the keys established 
during BAC. A sequence counter is included to prevent replay of messages.
PA: Passive Authentication. The data stored on the passport is organised in 
a logical data structure (LDS), which consists of a number of files (called data 
groups). Typical examples of data groups are: a file containing the information 
in the MRZ, a file containing a JPEG  image of the cardholder’s face, and files 
containing other biometric features such as the cardholder’s fingerprints.
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Each data group in the LDS is hashed. All these hashes together form the 
(document) security object SO LDS. The security object is signed by the issuing 
country and the result, SO D, is stored on the passport as well. This means 
that the inspection system can check tha t the contents of the LDS have not 
been altered during communication, thus ensuring the integrity of the LDS. The 
standards refer to this integrity protection mechanism as passive authentication.
AA: Active Authentication. To prevent cloning of the chip, an integrity mechan­
ism called active authentication is used, in which the passport proves possession 
of a private key using a challenge-response protocol. The corresponding 
public key, needed by the inspection system to check the response of the pass­
port, is part of the LDS and can be read by the inspection system. A hash of 
this public key is signed through the SO D, to ensure authenticity.
4.1 G uessing th e  A ccess K ey
To access the passport without having its MRZ, one needs to guess the access 
key seed k IFD/ ICC, which is 128 bits long. The National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) [18] and the ECRYPT EU Network of Excellence on 
cryptology [3] recommend 80 bits for a minimal level of general purpose protec­
tion in 2005, and 112 bits ten years from now. In other words, the access key 
seed is long enough to  provide adequate security.
But the fact tha t the access key seed is derived from information in the MRZ 
can be used to the attackers’ advantage. The ‘MRZ-information’ consists of the 
concatenation of the passport number, date of birth and date of expiry, including 
their respective check digits, as described in [9]. Given a guess for the MRZ- 
information, the corresponding access key seed kIFD/ i c c  is easily calculated, 
and from tha t all other session keys can be derived as well. These keys can then 
be tried against a transcript of an eavesdropped communication session between 
this passport and the reader, to see if they deliver meaningful data.
To estimate the amount of work the attacker needs to perform for such an off­
line attack, we estimate the amount of Shannon entropy of each of these fields. 
We should stress this is a very crude approach (unless we assume the underlying 
probability distributions are uniform). For lower bounds, we should in fact use 
the Guessing entropy [17] ( ^ * ip%) or even the min-entropy (min* — lo g p ). The 
Shannon entropy only gives us an upper bound, but if th a t bound is small the 
security of the system is most certainly weak.
The entropy of the date of birth field is log(100 x 365.25) =  15.16 bits, as it 
can contain only the last two digits of the year of birth. If one can see the holder 
of the passport and guess his age correct within a margin of 5 years, the entropy 
of this field decreases to 10.83.
The date of expiry is determined by the date of issuing and the validity period 
of a passport. In the Netherlands, passports are valid for 5 years, and are issued 
only on working days (barring exceptional circumstances). For a valid passport, 
the entropy of this field becomes log(5 x 365.25 x 5/7) =  10.34.
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No dates known
days
Legend: □  space to search
Fig. 2. Known dates of issuing reduce the search space.
The MRZ field for the passport number can contain 9 characters. If the pass­
port number is longer, the excess characters are stored in the MRZ optional 
data field (which is not used to derive the access key seed). The entropy of 
the passport number field, assuming digits and upper-case letters only, becomes 
log((26 +  10)9) =  46.53. Many countries have further restrictions on the format 
of their passport numbers. Passport numbers may contain check digits, or start 
with a common prefix to distinguish passport types (e.g., military passports).
At best, the total entropy of date of birth, date of expiry and passport number 
becomes 15.16+10.34+46.53 =  72.03, which is less than 80 bits recommended by 
both NIST and ECRYPT [3, 18] to protect against eavesdropping and other off­
line attacks. It is sufficient to  protect against skimming attacks (where possible 
keys are tried on-line) because the passport is slow to respond to each individual 
key tried.
In certain countries the situation is even worse. Often, passport numbers are 
issued sequentially. This implies there is a correlation between the date of issue 
(and therefore date of expiry) and the passport number. Moreover, all currently 
valid passports numbers (ignoring stolen or otherwise invalidated ones) form a 
consecutive range, which is no longer than the total number of people of that 
nationality. For the Dutch passport for instance, bounding the population from 
above by 20 million, the passport number entropy drops to log(20 x 106) =  24.25.
W ith sequentially issued passports, the entropy drops even further with every 
known combination of a passport number and the expiry date. Suppose we know 
k such combinations. This gives rise to k +  1 intervals of possible passport num­
bers for a given date range Let us take the rather pessimistic approach tha t we 
do not assume anything about the distribution of passports over dates within 
those intervals (although it is very likely th a t passports are issued at a reasonably 
constant rate). On the optimistic side, let us assume the k known passports are 
issued evenly distributed over the validity period length. This reduces the search 
space by a factor k +  1 as illustrated in Fig. 2. Hence the entropy of expiry date 
plus passport number drops with log(k +1). For the Dutch passport, using k = 1 5
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and the figures above, the entropy of the passport number becomes as small as 
20.25, and the total entropy could be as small as 10.83 +  10.34 +  20.25 =  41.42 
(when we assume we can guess the age of the passport holder).
One obvious idea is to include the MRZ optional data field in the list of 
MRZ items tha t is used to derive the MRZ access key seed. This would increase 
the entropy of the MRZ access key seed, especially if this optional data field 
is filled with random data. Unfortunately some countries already use this field 
for other purposes. In the Netherlands, for instance, this field stores the social- 
fiscal number, which is uniquely linked to  an individual and not very secret 
information. In fact, this idea was recently rejected for inclusion in the ICAO 
standards.
4.2 Traceability
To avoid collisions, contactless sm art cards and RFID systems use unique low- 
level tag identifiers in the radio communication protocol. This is also true for the 
e-passports. If this identifier is fixed (which is usually the case in RFID tags and 
contactless smart cards), passports are clearly easily traceable. Note th a t because 
this identifier is used in the very first stages of setting up a connection between 
the passport and the reader, no form of access control or reader authentication 
can be performed.
Luckily, this anti-collision identifier does not have to be fixed. The number 
can also be randomly generated each time the passport comes within range of a 
reader. If the random generator is of sufficient quality (and this is certainly an 
issue in low-end RFID systems), the passport can no longer be traced through 
the anti-collision identifier.
However, the anti-collision identifier creates a possible subliminal channel. 
For instance, instead of simply generating a random number r, the passport 
could be instructed to generate an anti collision identifier like
id =  EkNSA (r, passportnumber) .
The resulting string looks random, because of the randomness of r  and the 
properties of the encryption function. But clearly it can be decrypted by the 
owner of kNSA to reveal the passport number. Unless the passport chip is reverse 
engineered, the existence of such a subliminal channel cannot be detected.
Another subliminal channel exists when Active Authentication is used [5]. 
Recall th a t active authentication requires the passport to sign a challenge from 
a reader using its unique private key. Because the challenge is totally determ­
ined by the reader, the reader can embed information into this string, which is 
unknowingly signed by the passport. For instance, the challenge could contain 
the border crossing location, and the current date and time. A signature adds an 
extra layer of non-repudiability to the border crossing logs, and can be used to 
prove this fact to others. The challenge could also contain the passport number 
of the person verified ahead of you at border inspection, possibly linking you to 
the person you were travelling with.
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Even if all the above issues are addressed, discriminating features of pass­
ports remain. Different countries may use different chip suppliers. Later batches 
of passports will use more advanced technology, or may contain different or ad­
ditional information2. In the future, newer versions of chip operating systems 
may be used. All these differences may be noticeable by looking carefully at 
the behaviour of the chip on the radio channel, at the chip’s Answer To Reset 
(ATR), which is sent in reaction to a reset command by the reader, or at the 
responses the chip gives (or doesn’t give) to specific card commands sent to it. 
We expect to see large differences in behaviour especially on unintended, unex­
pected or even unspecified input sent to the card. All these things are possible 
before BAC has been performed.
Other applications may be put on the passports (see Sect. 6) as well. These 
applications may even be accessible before BAC has been performed. The set of 
available applications may actually constitute a narrow profile tha t identifies a 
specific set of possible passport holders, and may reveal the place of work, or 
the banks the passport holder has accounts with.
We conclude th a t even without access to the MRZ, i.e., in the classic skim­
ming scenario on streets, public transport, etc., passports still leak information 
that can be traced back to individuals, or groups of individuals.
5 E xtend ed  A ccess Control
Standardisation of the security features and biometrics to be used in European 
passports has been taken up independently (but of course in accordance with 
the ICAO standards) by the European Union [7]. In recognition of the fact that 
biometric information is quite sensitive, the European Union has m andated that 
such data should be protected by a so-called “Extended Access Control” mech­
anism. The technical specifications of the European e-passport are drafted by a 
special EU Committee, founded as a result of Article 6 of Regulation 1683/95 
laying down a uniform format for visas [6].
Public information about the details of Extended Access Control has recently 
become available [5, 16]. This allows us to discuss certain shortcomings in the 
schemes under consideration, although we wish to stress tha t these schemes are 
a huge improvement over the extremely minimal security features imposed by 
the ICAO standards.
Extended Access Control consists of two phases, Chip Authentication fol­
lowed by Terminal Authentication. Chip Authentication performs the same func­
tion as Active Authentication in the ICAO standards, i.e., proving the chip is 
genuine and thus protecting the passport against cloning. It avoids the problems 
associated with active authentication, like the challenge semantics discussed in 
the previous section. Chip authentication achieves its task by first exchanging a 
session key using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The chip uses a static key pair 
for this, the public part of which is part of the logical data structure (LDS) on
2 Indeed, th e  first p assp o rts  will be issued w ith o u t fingerprints.
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Fig. 3. Extended Access Control certificates
the chip and thus signed through the security objects SO D. The terminal uses 
a fresh key pair for each session. Authenticity of the chip is established once the 
chip proves tha t it knows the session key, which happens implicitly when the 
session key is used successfully to communicate with the chip.
Terminal Authentication aims to prove to the chip th a t the terminal is al­
lowed to access the data on the chip. This access is granted through a chain of 
certificates, the root of which is the issuer of the passport at hand (see Fig. 3) . 
In other words, the issuer of the passport controls who can access the data on 
the passport. This root issues Document Verifier (DV) Certificates, one for each 
country tha t is granted access to the data on the passport. These DV certificates 
are used to generate Inspection System (IS) certificates, which can be distrib­
uted to inspection systems (e.g., readers/terminals) at border crossings. Each 
passport issued by a particular country can verify the authenticity of these DV 
certificates, and hence of the IS certificates issued through these DV certificates. 
A valid IS certificate grants access to certain data on the chip. All certificates 
have a limited validity period.
Terminal authentication, as proposed, does have a few weaknesses. First of 
all, the chip cannot keep time itself, and does not have access to a reliable source 
of time either. This makes it hard to  check whether a certificate has expired 
or not. This, in turn, makes it practically impossible to  revoke a certificate. 
The problem is the following. A terminal with a valid IS certificate and a valid 
DV certificate can access the sensitive data on many passports. When such a 
terminal is stolen, these access rights remain, even when the validity period 
of these certificates has expired: the chip does not know the correct time, and 
the terminal does not have to tell it the correct time. This is the case even if 
certificates have extremely short validity periods, like a single day. We see that 
one stolen terminal breaks the intended security goal of terminal authentication. 
Of course, stolen terminals do not make skimming attacks possible: a terminal 
still needs access to the MRZ in order to perform basic access control. To mitigate 
the problem somewhat, the standards propose that the chip keeps the most 
recent date seen on a valid certificate. In other words, the chip advances its
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idea of the current time each time it passes a border inspection system. This 
only saves the frequent travellers; people th a t barely use their passports stay 
vulnerable for a long time.
Secondly, the certificate hierarchy itself poses a problem. The hierarchy is 
quite shallow. It does not make it easy to allow access to the biometric data 
for other applications beyond border inspection, even though such applications 
are already being discussed today (see also Sect. 6 below). To acquire access, 
one has to apply for IS certificates at the country DV, or for a DV certificate 
at each issuing country. The latter would create a huge management overhead, 
as it would require each country to reliably verify the identity and trustwor­
thiness of the requesting applicant and issue certificates in response. The first 
makes it impossible for countries to differentiate access rights among different 
applications, and would make the country DV responsible for the issuing of IS 
certificates for each and every terminal involved in the new application. This 
is clearly impractical, if we consider the use of passports for home banking or 
single sign-on systems tha t require terminals at each and every PC.
Making the certificate hierarchy larger and more flexible may not be an 
option. It means the chip has to  verify even more certificates before it can grant 
access. This does put quite a burden on the processing capabilities of the chip, 
which should guarantee reasonably short transaction times. No one is willing 
to stand in the queue at border inspection for an even longer amount of time, 
simply because the new passports contain new, but slow, technology. A different, 
more flexible, approach is discussed in Sect. 9.
6 N ew  A pp lications
The new e-passport requires an international infrastructure for biometric verific­
ation. This is a huge project, of which the effectiveness and risks are uncertain. 
The main driving force is political pressure: the logic of politics simply requires 
high profile action in the face of international terrorism. Once implemented, it 
inevitably leads to function creep: new possible applications emerge, either spon­
taneously or via new policy initiatives. We shall discuss two such applications, 
and speculate about the future.
Once we obtain a new passport with a high-end chip embedded with which we 
can communicate ourselves (via open standards), we can ask ourselves whether 
we can also use it for our own purposes. We briefly discuss two options: logon, 
and digital signatures.
The e-passport can be used to log on to  your computer account. For instance, 
if you give your MRZ (or the associated keys) to your computer or local network, 
the logon procedure can set up a challenge-response session with your passport: 
activation of the chip happens via the MRZ, and checking of a signature written 
by the passport-chip on a challenge generated by your computer can proceed 
via the public key of the document signer. It allows your computer to check 
the integrity of the passports security object, which contains the public key 
corresponding to  the private signature-key of your passport.
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This authentication procedure only involves “something you have” : anyone 
holding your passport can log in to your machine. You can strengthen the pro­
cedure by requiring a usual password, or even a biometric check based on a 
comparison of facial images (a freshly taken one, and the one on the chip).
You may also wish to use your e-passport to sign documents and emails using 
the embedded private key for Active Authentication. This is not such a good idea, 
for two reasons. First of all, the signature is obtained by exploiting the challenge- 
response mechanism for another purpose. Such interference should be avoided, 
because a challenge-response at a border inspection could then be misused to 
trick you into signing a certain document. Secondly, proving your identity after 
signing requires publication of your MRZ, together with the security object of 
your passport-chip (which is integrity-protected by a signature of the document 
signer): this object couples the public key (for your signature) to identifying 
information such as your name. But releasing the MRZ allows everyone to access 
your passport, through Basic Access Control.
The underlying problem is tha t the e-passport was not designed with an 
embedded useful certificate (such as X.509) for the holder.
Once there is an infrastructure for biometric verification, it becomes natural 
to ask: why not use it for identification as well? People may loose (willingly 
or unwillingly) their passport, or may apply for multiple copies, possibly under 
different names. Indeed, the government of the Netherlands is preparing legisla­
tion [1, 2] to set up a central database with biometric information, in order to 
“increase the effectiveness of national identification laws” . Such a central data­
base goes beyond what is required by European directives.
The possibility of biometric identification of the entire (passport-holding) 
population involves a change of power balance between states and their citizens. 
Consent or cooperation is then no longer needed for identification. Tracing and 
tracking of individuals becomes possible on a scale tha t we have not seen before.
Assuming the biometric passport leads to a reliable infrastructure for verifica­
tion and identification of individuals, the societal pressure will certainly increase 
to use it in various other sectors than just border inspection. Such applications 
are not foreseen—or covered by—European regulations. Interested parties are 
police and intelligence forces, banks and credit card companies, social security 
organisations, car rental firms, casinos, etc. Where do we draw the line, if any?
We see tha t the introduction of the new e-passport is not only a large tech­
nical and organisational challenge, but also a societal one. Governments are im­
plicitly asking for acceptance of this new technology. This acceptance question 
is not so explicit, but is certainly there. If some political action group makes a 
strong public case against the e-passport, and manages to convince a large part 
of the population to immediately destroy the embedded chip after issuance—for 
instance by putting the passport in a microwave—the whole enterprise will fail. 
The interesting point is tha t individuals do have decisive power over the use of 
the chip in their e-passport. Even stronger, such a political action group may 
decide to build disruptive equipment th a t can destroy the RFID-chips from some 
distance, so th a t passports are destroyed without the holder knowing (immedi­
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ately). To counter such movements, governments may try  to make it sufficiently 
unattractive or even impossible to cross borders for travellers without a func­
tioning passport. This is only possible, however, if the numbers of broken chips 
is relatively low. And in any case, it will not improve popularity of the scheme 
to begin with.
7 Id en tity  M anagem ent Issues
Identity management (IM) is about “rules-4-roles” : regulation of identification, 
authentication and authorisation in and between organisations. The new e- 
passport is part of IM by states. It forms an identification and authentication 
mechanism th a t is forced upon citizens, primarily for international movement, 
but also for internal purposes.
Identification and authentication in everyday life is a negotiation process. 
When a stranger in the street asks for your biometric data, you will refuse. But 
you may engage in a conversation, discover mutual interests, and exchange busi­
ness cards or phone numbers. Upon a next contact more identifying information 
may be released, possibly leading to a gradual buildup of trust.
The e-passport, in contrast, provides a rigid format. In certain situations it 
forms an overkill, for instance when you just need to prove tha t you are over 
eighteen. When IM goes digital and becomes formalised one would like to  have 
more flexible mechanisms, with individual control via personal policies. In the 
future we may expect to be carrying identity tokens tha t flexibly react to the 
environment. Three basic rules for such systems are:
— The environment should authenticate itself first. For instance, when the en­
vironment can prove to be my home, my policy allows my token to release 
much personal information, for instance about my music preference or health.
— Authentication should be possible in small portions, for instance via certi­
ficates or credentials saying “this person is over eighteen” , with a signature 
provided by a relevant authority.
— Automatic recognition of individuals, for instance via an implanted RFID 
chip that broadcasts your personal (social security) number, is excluded. 
Privacy is im portant for personal security—and not, as too often stated, 
only an impediment to public security.
8 E valuation  o f Security  G oals
In Sect. 2 we have formulated three security goals th a t we consider reasonable. 
In this section we evaluate whether the current system meets these goals.
Readers should identify themselves first In the usual sense of “authenticated” or 
“trusted” readers, this goal is not reached. For instance, we managed to write 
our own terminal application tha t retrieves the public information like the facial 
image from the chip. And our reader is not considered trusted. The implemented
Crossing Borders 13
BAC protocol only assures that the reader has knowledge of the MRZ on the 
passport. In the European implementation of EAC the reader must authenticate 
itself and hence this goal is more or less met for the information marked as 
sensitive, but weaknesses exist (see Sect. 5) .
Consent by the passport holders Theoretically this goal is reached. By use of 
BAC any terminal th a t tries to read information first needs to read the MRZ 
information printed on the inside of the passport. Hence the holder must give his 
consent for the transaction by opening his passport. However, as we have seen 
in Sect. 4.2 some subliminal channels exist tha t may leak information about the 
card even before BAC has been applied or in other words even before the holder 
has given his consent.
Proof of integrity and authenticity The integrity part of this goal is reached 
by the secure messaging system, which is applied for all communication after 
BAC. As we have seen in Sect. 4 both commands and responses are encrypted 
and augmented with a message authentication code to provide integrity and 
confidentiality. Authenticity of the information is guaranteed through Passive 
Authentication (see Sect. 4)
9 e-P assport v2
Until now we have discussed several issues with the security and privacy protec­
tion of the current proposed standards for biometric passports, from both ICAO 
and, in particular, the EU. We have argued tha t protection mechanisms should 
be improved. However, improvements to such standards are at best incremental, 
and do not usually challenge the primary design decisions. In fact, such funda­
mental changes would certainly be backwards incompatible, and require a totally 
new standard. In our opinion, more fundamental changes are required to really 
provide strong security and proper privacy protection to the new generation of 
e-passports.
9.1 A void ing C ontactless Cards
The most fundamental change is to reconsider the choice for a wireless commu­
nication interface between the chip in the passport and the terminal at border 
inspection. Using a wireless interface makes skimming attacks possible. It is ex­
actly the fear of this possibility tha t has sparked a huge controversy over the 
current e-passport proposals. Initially, the US passports would not even imple­
ment Basic Access Control. Now they are even considering to include metal 
shields in the cover pages of the passport to function as a Faraday cage, to 
physically disable the wireless communication link.
But all Basic Access Control really is, is a very elaborate way to achieve 
exactly the same as what is achieved when inserting a smart card with contacts 
into the slot of a reader: namely tha t the holder of the passport allows the
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owner of the terminal to read the data on the chip. Then, why not simply use 
smart cards with contacts for the new e-passport? The main arguments against 
this have been the form-factor of the passport, and the need for a sufficient 
bandwidth to quickly transm it the biometric data from the card to the terminal. 
However, identity cards and drivers licenses with dimensions similar to credit 
cards (ID-1) are already under consideration. And bandwidth concerns are no 
longer an issue either. Many smart card suppliers already sell smart cards with 
integrated USB 1.1 interfaces tha t allow for a much higher throughput, using 
the original [12] ISO contact module found on the card, and standardisation 
for this approach is underway [13]. Such a solution would take away all worries 
associated with using a wireless chip, and would keep the e-passport clear of all 
discussions surrounding the (perceived) privacy issues with RFID.
9.2 O n-line Term inal A u th en tication
Once a connection between passport and terminal is established, a decision has to 
be made regarding the access rights of the terminal and to determine which data 
on the passport it is allowed to read. Current EU proposals for extended access 
control are found wanting: stolen terminals cannot be revoked, and the shallow, 
rigid certificate hierarchy proposed to regulate access does not allow for flexible 
and/or dynamic access control policies (see Sect. 5) . The EU approach was 
chosen to allow for off-line, mobile terminals, like those tha t are used by mobile 
border inspection units. But clearly such mobile terminals can be connected to 
the network over a wireless link, if only through GPRS, which is the standard 
on cell phones these days.
If we assume tha t terminals are always connected to the network, we can use 
on-line terminal authentication. The general idea is then the following.
Each terminal owns a private/public key pair. Each terminal is used for a 
particular application. This application is encoded in a certificate C a a  tha t con­
tains the public key K T a  of the terminal, and which is signed by the application 
authority AA. Access rights are associated with application. Each country stores, 
for each application authority tha t it wishes to recognise, the access rights for 
that application. These access rights are stored in the back office. The back office 
also stores the public keys of all terminals tha t have been revoked.
On-line terminal authentication then proceeds as follows. First, the terminal 
sends the certificate C a a  (containing its public key K T a ) to the chip. The chip 
and the terminal perform a challenge-response protocol in which the terminal 
proves to the chip tha t it owns the private key corresponding to K T a . This 
establishes the identity of the terminal. Next, the chip sets up an authenticated 
channel between itself and the back office of the issuing country. It can do so 
using a country certificate tha t is stored in the chip during personalisation. The 
channel should not be vulnerable to replay attacks. It sends C a a  (and K T a ) to 
the back-office. There, C a a  is verified against the known application authorities 
(this validates th a t K T a  was certified by such an authority) and K T a  is checked 
against the list of all revoked terminals. If these checks pass, the access rights for 
AA are sent back to the chip. If not, then the empty set (i.e., no access rights) is
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sent back to  the chip. The chip interprets the access rights it receives and grants 
access to the terminal accordingly. Because the channel is authentic and does 
not allow replay attacks, the access rights received by the chip correspond to the 
certificate it sent to the back office.
W ith on-line terminal authentication, terminals can be revoked in real-time: 
as soon as they are marked as revoked in the back offices of the issuing country, 
no passport of th a t country will allow th a t terminal access to its data. Also, 
the access permissions can be changed dynamically, and can even be based on 
the exact time the request was made, or on the specific usage pattern of the 
passport. The general idea can be refined to also allow revocation of terminals 
by the countries tha t manage them, instead of requiring them to inform all 
other countries th a t a particular terminal should be revoked (because it was 
stolen, for instance). Also, more levels of certificates can be introduced, to make 
management of access rights easier.
9.3 O ther Im provem ents
In Sect. 3 we have seen tha t real pictures are stored on the chip. W ith an 
immediate consequence tha t whoever is able to retrieve these images from the 
chip, has access to good biometric data, which he can use for identity theft. Using 
templates tha t work like a one-way function, it will be possible to check whether 
the template on the chip matches the tem plate derived from the person who is 
claiming to be the holder of the passport. This leaking of real biometric data 
may not seem such a big deal in a time where many pictures are published on the 
Internet. The point here is th a t these pictures for the passports are taken under 
good conditions and hence provides highly accurate biometric information.
The entropy-related off-line attacks discussed in Sect. 4.1 are possible be­
cause a guess of MRZ-information directly leads to all keys used in a commu­
nication session. These keys can be checked against a transcript of tha t session 
to verify the guess. The situation is similar to many password-based authentica­
tion and session-setup protocols. Encrypted key exchange protocols, discovered 
by Bellovin and M erritt [4], do not suffer from this problem. There a low en­
tropy password is used to exchange a high entropy secret tha t cannot efficiently 
be guessed using an off-line attack3. Using encrypted key exchange protocols for 
basic access control would strengthen the security of the passport considerably.
In Sect. 6 we have seen th a t it will be inevitable tha t other applications 
want to use the infrastructure available on the chip for other purposes than the 
original ones. In the current system it is already possible to sign things with a 
private key, but this causes some unwanted side effects as already described in 
Sect. 6. In order to prevent this the standards should be rewritten in such a way 
that at least these additional functions can be used and preferably in a disjoint 
setting from the border inspection functions. A possible implementation for this 
could be to have an X.509 certificate included with a public key tha t has nothing 
to do with the MRZ or other information needed for the border inspection tasks.
3 O f course on-line a tta ck s  w here all possible passw ords are  tr ied  one by one can  never 
be prevented .
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